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REFLECTIONS ON JURYPHOBIA AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REFORM
Stephan Landsman *
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a volume enti-
tled To Err is Human.1 That report identified medical errors as one of
the leading challenges facing medicine.2 The IOM's most headline-
making conclusions were that as many as 98,000 hospitalized Ameri-
cans die each year due to mistakes made by their caretakers and that
hundreds of thousands more are injured during the course of treat-
ment. 3 The IOM noted that misadventure in hospitals was but one
aspect of a far larger national medical error problem that also encom-
passes iatrogenic injury in outpatient facilities, nursing homes, and
doctors' offices. 4
Reaction to the IOM's report was swift and dramatic. Media atten-
tion was "frenzied," 5 and Congress scheduled hearings. 6 President
Clinton delivered a major address in February 2000, in which he en-
dorsed a number of proposals from a federal interagency task force,
declared a National Action Plan with the goal of cutting preventable
* Professor and Robert A. Clifford Chair in Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University
College of Law. An earlier version of these materials was prepared for and presented at The
University of Nebraska, which will be publishing them as a chapter in a volume entitled CIVIL
JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE (Brian Bornstein ed., 2008).
1. COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To
ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [herein-
after To ERR Is HUMAN].
2. Id. at 26. The concern about medical error grew steadily throughout the second half of the
1990s, spurred by widely publicized malpractice horror stories, a series of high-profile confer-
ences and the formation of an alliance of business and labor leaders dedicated to addressing the
problem. See Paul Barach, The End of the Beginning: Lessons Learned from the Patient Safety
Movement, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 7, 10-12 (2003).
3. To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 26.
4. Id. at 30-31: David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in
the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 893, 903-04 (2005).
5. See David H. Johnson & David W. Shapiro, The Institute of Medicine Report on Reducing
Medical Error and Its Implications for Healthcare Providers and Attorneys, 12 HEALTH LAW. 1, 1
(2000).
6. See Hearing on Medical Errors Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Barach, supra note 2, at 12.
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medical error-related deaths by 50% in five years, announced the pro-
mulgation of new regulations affecting the 6,000 hospitals across the
nation that received Medicare funds, and called for the creation of a
nationwide, state-based reporting system with both mandatory and
voluntary components. 7 Before his speech, the President had directed
federal agencies to begin an effort to implement the IOM's
proposals.8
Policymakers have proposed a variety of reforms to deal with the
challenge of medical error. Although they advanced many before the
IOM released its report, that document gave virtually all proposals at
least a temporary boost. The thrust of many of these reforms has
been to reduce medical mistakes and the harm they cause through
disclosure of errors to either health professionals or patients. There
have been essentially two objectives: first, to prevent future treatment
errors; and second, to address injuries already suffered by patients.
Among the preventive measures, policymakers have most frequently
urged the collection, analysis, and reporting of large bodies of data
concerning treatment mistakes.9 There has been considerable debate
about precisely what sort of data should be the focus of such efforts.
Some have called for concentration on sentinel or catastrophic events
that result in death or serious injury to patients. 10 Others have pro-
posed the identification and review of all events that cause patient
injury." Still others, taking a page from the book of the civil aviation
industry, urge the identification and recording of "near misses"-
events that did not result in harm but could have under slightly differ-
ent circumstances. 12 Reformers view the gathering and reporting of
data of any of these types as a stepping-stone to analysis that can
pinpoint risks in the delivery of medical care and lead to the develop-
ment of protocols that can prevent injury.13
Most prominent among the proposals designed to address injured
patients' needs are those calling for more candid communications be-
7. William Clinton, Remarks by the President on Medical Errors (Feb. 22, 2000), available at
http:/www.ahrq.gov/wh22200rem.htm; see also Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 5.
8. See Barach, supra note 2, at 12.
9. See id. at 18; Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safety, 3 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 181, 182 (2003).
10. See Furrow, supra note 9, at 203 (discussing the IOM proposal); id. at 207 (describing the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations Sentinel Event Policy).
11. Id. at 213 (detailing Pennsylvania's legislative approach).
12. On aviation near-miss reporting, see Barach, supra note 2, at 20-21. On medical use of
the near-miss approach, see Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 931.
13. See Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care: Addressing Federal-
State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote Patient Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 219, 225 (2003).
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tween healthcare professionals and patients who have been injured in
their care. 14 Building on this notion, some reformers have urged that,
whenever medical error is discovered, the caregivers should apologize
and, in at least some contexts, seek to negotiate an appropriate com-
pensatory settlement. 15
With so many interested players calling for change and advancing so
many reform proposals, it is striking how little actual reform has been
accomplished and how much the medical community has resisted
modest changes and proposals.1 6 In fact, the major push from within
the medical establishment has not been for internal changes to ad-
dress medical errors, but rather for capped damage awards for those
most severely injured by medical malpractice, as classified by the legal
system.17 The futility of this step in responding to the incidence of
medical malpractice and its tragic discriminations against children and
the elderly have been frequently examined and will not be the focus of
this Article.1 8 It should be noted, however, that the cap movement
provides an insight into the healthcare industry's virtually single-
minded preoccupation with lawsuits and large monetary awards when-
ever the question of error arises. This Article refers to that preoccu-
pation as "juryphobia," because the fear of jury action that appears to
be at its core has been the healthcare industry's primary justification
for resisting reform. This Article begins with an examination of the
rhetoric of juryphobia and its impact on reform proposals. It then
suggests the utility of an empirical examination testing the claims of
those who fear that change will lead to a massive increase in the num-
ber and size of malpractice jury awards. It concludes by considering
curative steps that might be taken to counter hypothesized adverse
jury reactions to reform.
14. See Keith Myers, Medical Errors: Causes, Cures, and Capitalism, 16 J.L. & HEALTH 255,
278 (2002); Furrow, supra note 9, at 207.
15. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example
from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000).
16. See D.E. Altman et al., Improving Patient Safety-Five Years After the IOM Report, 357
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2041, 2042-43 (2004); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability
Reform Should Make Patients Safer: "Avoidable Classes of Events" Are a Key Improvement, 33
J.L. MED. & ETHics 478, 478 (2005) ("Half a decade [after To Err Is Human], significant reduc-
tion of injury remains a distant prospect, despite some apparent progress."); Lucian L. Leape &
Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA
2384, 2385-90 (2005).
17. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 481.
18. See, e.g., Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005); Lucinda M.
Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J.
1263 (2004); David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a "No-Fault" System of
Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 1997).
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II. A REPORT FROM THE FIELD
Over the past several years, the medical establishment and various
governmental units have considered an array of information-sharing
proposals to address the problem of medical error. I was involved in
one such effort undertaken by a leading medical reform organization
(call it "the MRO") located in a Midwestern community. 19 The MRO
concluded that patient safety was a high-priority concern and that
data should be gathered and analyzed to determine if patterns of error
might be discovered and protective protocols designed. As has been
the case in the literature on reporting, precisely what information
should be gathered was a matter of debate. Some thought all errors
ought to be recorded and examined, while others thought more would
be gained if near-miss events alone were scrutinized. Another source
of contention was whether different institutions, including major hos-
pitals and healthcare providers like HMOs, could and should share
error data with each other, thereby creating a broader and richer pool
for analysis.
My job was to provide legal analysis to the MRO regarding the vul-
nerability of the data gathered by such error reporting to discovery in
litigation. Healthcare professionals found this issue significant be-
cause of their apparent deep and abiding anxiety about disclosure and
its legal consequences.20 The state in which these events took place
had legislation extending privilege protection to data gathered and
prepared for internal quality control purposes, such as peer review or
medical studies. 21 The contours of the privilege shielding records
from disclosure to medical malpractice plaintiffs were not entirely
clear. There was a series of judicial decisions granting injured patients
access to items, such as HMO documents refusing to approve treat-
ment, informal conversations among medical staff regarding patient
injury, and incident reports created during treatment or care. In this
unsettled legal environment, there was a great deal of concern about
the scope and reliability of the privilege. In a written evaluation, I
19. 1 have chosen to present this material without identifying characteristics in order to pro-
tect the confidences of those who participated in the MRO's work.
20. See Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
751, 765 (1997); J. Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and Aviation:
Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 745. 747 (2000) (cited in Melissa Chiang, Note, Pro-
moting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting System, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 396 n.60
(2001)) (stating that 71% of medical practitioners found acknowledging error to be difficult due
to the threat of malpractice suits).
21. See generally William D. Bremer, Scope and Extent of Protection from Disclosure of Medi-
cal Peer Review Proceedings Relating to Claim in Medical Malpractice Action, 69 A.L.R. 5th 559
(2004).
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suggested that a program could be designed, however, that was highly
likely to assure privilege protection, so long as certain formalities were
followed and litigation-related risk management operations were sep-
arated from safety-focused medical study activities. 22
To my surprise, my recommendations were viewed as extremely
controversial. Medical professional participants in the MRO found
them encouraging, while hospital lawyers in the group were intensely
hostile. 23 The lawyers' concerns were diffuse, but turned on several
key points. First and foremost, hospital counsel argued that privileged
materials were never truly safe from discovery and that juries pro-
vided with such materials would inevitably use them to award huge
damages. Second, plaintiffs' lawyers would exploit any reform for
their own nefarious purposes. 24 Third, counsel argued that their insur-
ance coverage arrangements imposed restrictions on data sharing that
simply made the proposal impossible.2 5 Finally, the lawyers said that
hospital counsel and the associated risk-management teams needed
access to all care-related information in order to effectively protect
their clients. 26 It became increasingly clear that the hospital attorneys
were in the grips of an irrational fear that could not be assuaged by
legal analysis, reason, or program revision. Because counsel were so
adamant in their opposition and alarmed by my analysis, they
threatened to scuttle any progress in error reporting if my work were
relied upon or if I were to continue as a major contributor to the re-
form project. Subsequently, I was eased out of the effort.
The intensity of this opposition undermined the MRO's patient
safety initiative. Progress on error reporting slowed to a crawl, and no
system yet exists or will likely be implemented soon. Moreover, if this
Article's analysis is correct, the privileged status of error reports in
any such system is now in greater jeopardy because of the continued
22. Id. That separation was apparently mandated by the applicable statute and case law.
23. Some data suggest that doctors themselves do not believe that the law will protect the
confidentiality of error-reporting materials. Chiang, supra note 20, at 396 n.61 (finding that 85%
of healthcare professionals in one non-rigorous online survey doubted that confidentiality pro-
tection existed). My experience suggests that this may have more to do with the legal advice
provided by hospital, HMO, and insurance company counsel than with health professionals' ex-
periences or personal beliefs.
24. 1 was identified with plaintiffs' lawyers because I occupy a chair endowed by an eminent
plaintiffs' personal injury lawyer.
25. Insurance contracts generally require the cooperation of the insured in defending claims.
It may be argued, albeit unpersuasively, that information sharing betrays that requirement. See
Cohen, supra note 15, at 1471-72 (focusing on apology rather than error reporting); Bryan A.
Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying and Filling the Holes in the
Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 346, 353 (2001).
26. On the limited efficacy of risk management, see Liang, supra note 25, at 348.
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yoking together of risk management and patient safety initiatives, de-
spite legal requirements that they be separated. One of the most im-
portant reasons for the slow pace of patient-safety reform is that the
lawyers advising doctors, and the physicians listening to them, appar-
ently embrace a paranoid vision of the legal world.27 Behind that vi-
sion is the proposition that juries in medical malpractice actions are
ready to find against healthcare providers and to award enormous
damages on virtually any pretext. This view has two corollaries: first,
that plaintiffs' lawyers exploit such jury proclivities for their own ve-
nal ends; and second, that insurance companies are properly worried
about juries, justifying the barriers they sometimes seek to impose on
information sharing and other reforms. In the grips of this juryphobia,
any reform that fails to remove courtroom adjudication and jury trials
is either doomed to rejection by the medicolegal establishment or will
face substantial resistance in implementation.
III. JURYPHOBIA IN THE LITERATURE OF PATIENT SAFETY AND
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
The juryphobia I encountered while working for the MRO is readily
visible in the literature advocating patient safety and medical malprac-
tice reform. Unsurprisingly, many contributors to this literature also
provide legal advice to the healthcare industry. Fear of juries and the
desire to keep records from them dominate the works that urge re-
porting reform. Commentators have also deployed juryphobic rheto-
ric to oppose the implementation of various reporting schemes
mandated by both state statutes and the national hospital accrediting
body, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions (JCAHO). 28 Virtually all reformers assert that error reporting is
impossible unless ironclad guarantees of confidentiality are pro-
vided.29 Their objective is to establish a walled-off error-reporting
universe with complete internal openness, "largely surrounded by an
external wall to shut out injured patients and their lawyers. '30
27. That vision extends to other areas as well, such as end-of-life decisions, where some hospi-
tal counsel have imposed inappropriate legal constraints on familial and medical decision mak-
ing. See Norman Fost. Do the Right Thing: Samuel Linares and Defensive Law, 17 LAW, MED. &
HEALrH CARE 330 (1989); Marshall B. Kapp, Treating Medical Charts Near the End of Life:
How Legal Anxieties Inhibit Good Patient Deaths, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 521 (1997).
28. See JCAHO Home Page. http://www.jointcommission.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
29. See, e.g., Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 6 ("Perhaps the greatest impediment to the
successful implementation of error reduction systems is... the fundamental question of whether
and how reported information can be kept confidential."): accord Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra
note 16, at 480.
30. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16. at 480.
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Reformers' primary reason for this protective demand is to counter
their fear that plaintiffs' attorneys, either through discovery in litiga-
tion or other means, like freedom of information requests, will seize
the candid and revealing error assessment documents dutifully filed by
cooperating doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals. 31 As
one commentator picturesquely described healthcare providers' fears,
error reports "would attract plaintiff [sic] attorneys as surely as honey
attracts bears. '32 This imagery illustrates the healthcare industry's
anxieties. Plaintiffs' lawyers are depicted as bears-large and fierce
beasts with voracious appetites. The information they seek is analo-
gized to the sweetest, most attractive substance in the ursine world, a
commodity bears will do almost anything to get.
According to error-reporting advocates, records seized by members
of the plaintiffs' bar will lead to a significantly increased number of
malpractice claims filed.33 Such reporting systems, like that created
by JCAHO, have been described as a "lawsuit kit for attorneys. '34
Reformers contend that, with error-reporting documents in hand, pa-
tients and their lawyers will be able to cow doctors, hospitals, and
HMOs into settling ever more cases. 35 Where settlement cannot be
achieved, such "smoking gun" documents will persuade juries to find
malpractice and award substantial sums. 36 Some reporting advocates
have sought to further their campaign against malpractice liability by
strengthening this nightmare scenario with anecdotal horror stories.
One example is the case where an error -was disclosed when it could
easily have been hidden and the result was "a protracted lawsuit. '37
Such a scenario is reminiscent of the campaign against juries, lawyers,
and courts by those who repeatedly and inaccurately referenced the
case of Stella Liebeck, who was scalded when a cup of McDonald's
coffee spilled in her lap. 38 In both cases, with virtually no supporting
data, one is invited to assume that, left to itself, the legal system will
produce absurd and unjust results.
When error reporting is mandated and confidentiality is not guaran-
teed, commentators claim that doctors and other healthcare profes-
31. See Liang & Small, supra note 13, at 238.
32. Furrow, supra note 9, at 183.
33. See Liang, supra note 25, at 351; but see Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical
Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 207 (2005)
(finding that, in Texas, numbers of large claims held steady and smaller claims declined).
34. Black et al., supra note 33, at 351.
35. See Liang & Small, supra note 13, at 238.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 231-32 n.66.
38. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 183-226 (2004).
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sionals experience mounting anxiety about their exposure to legal
liability. This anxiety chills medical personnels' willingness to file any
reports at all. Richard Davidson, once President of the American
Hospital Association (AHA), relied upon this argument when he de-
clared that reporting is "not possible if some plaintiff's attorney is
climbing on your back."'39 Where reporting has been mandated, un-
derreporting is common. 40 The same has been true with respect to
both the JCAHO and the Veterans Administration's (VA) reporting
systems. 41 In all of these cases, reform advocates claim that uncer-
tainty about access to, or use of, reports has impeded cooperation. 42
Some medical malpractice reformers believe that the situation was not
always this way and that justified distrust of juries, lawyers, and courts
is rising and "transforming healthcare. ' ' 43 In this view, which seems to
harken back to a lost golden era, doctors have become so fearful that
they shy away from making records of any sort. 44
Recently, a movement has arisen championing the idea that doctors
and hospitals should apologize to patients whom they have harmed. 45
Those who urge disclosure of information about injurious errors argue
that patients have a therapeutic and moral claim to be informed about
medical mistakes and treatment-related injuries. 46 Only properly in-
formed patients can address their injuries through treatment, let alone
consider legal remedies. The American Medical Association (AMA)
and the AHA both concluded that physicians' ethical responsibilities
include informing patients of iatrogenic injuries. 47 Those who suggest
39. Chiang, supra note 20, at 391 (citing Robert Pear, Clinton to Order Steps to Reduce Medi-
cal Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at Al).
40. See id. at 393 ("[Iln Pennsylvania, which requires reports for gross events such as deaths
due to injuries, suicide, [or] malnutrition, the Department of Health received only one report for
the one-year period that ended in June 1999.").
41. See Furrow, supra note 9, at 208; David A. Hyman & Charles Silver. Believing Six Improb-
able Things: Medical Malpractice and "Legal Fear," 28 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 107, 110
(2004).
42. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
43. See Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Heal the Law, Then Health Care, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25. 2004, at B7.
44. Id.
45. See Jonathan R. Cohen. Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999);
Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy
Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221 (1999): but see Lee Taft. Apology
Subverted: The Commodification of Apology. 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
46. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 482: Cohen, supra note 15. at 1477.
47. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 482. The AMA has stated that doctors have an
ethical duty to "at all times deal honestly and openly with patients" and provide them "all the
facts necessary to ensure understanding of what has occurred," so that they will "be able to make
informed decisions regarding future medical care." Id.
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that medical providers should apologize for injuries they have caused
argue that patients deserve the respect and contrition of an apology.48
Despite the powerful medical and moral appeal of providing pa-
tients with information and, if appropriate, an apology, substantial re-
sistance to both exists in the medical industry. Again, reformers lay
most of the blame on the legal system. Some assert that doctors
phrase everything exceedingly carefully because of their fear of being
sued after admitting errors to patients. 49 Physicians will often say
nothing at all even if candor would best serve their patients' inter-
ests.50 Reformers claim that disclosure will likely result in a traumatic
and debilitating lawsuit. 51 Similar to the case of reporting, reformers
claim that plaintiffs' lawyers lurk in the shadows, ready to pounce on
any admission. 52 The natural and predictable result, so the argument
goes, is that doctors and other caregivers feel a chill that leads them to
adopt a policy of silence. 53
Apology first gained serious attention among reformists in 1987
when the VA hospital in Lexington, Kentucky adopted an innovative
program responding to acts of medical malpractice by its staff.54 As
soon as the VA hospital discovered an injurious medical error to a
patient, it would contact that patient or her surrogate, apologize for
the error, advise the patient to obtain the assistance of counsel, and
offer monetary compensation or other corrective action.55 The pro-
gram was remarkably successful, particularly in boosting staff morale,
reducing patients' suspicions and hostilities, and reducing the hospi-
tal's overall expenditures on medical malpractice claims.56
This program of candid disclosure, apology, and compensation
seemingly contradicts juryphobia; however, much of the apology liter-
ature has carefully distinguished the situation at the VA from other
healthcare settings. Reformists argue that these differences doom
apology to failure outside the VA system unless broad confidentiality
protections are extended to apologizing doctors and hospitals.57
48. See Taft, supra note 45, at 1160.
49. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 482.
50. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1011.
51. See Rachel Zimmerman, Doctors' New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying 'I'm Sorry,' WALL
ST. J., May 18, 2004, at Al; Randall R. Bovbjerg, Patient Safety and Physician Silence, 25 J.
LEGAL MED. 505 (2004).
52. See Bovbjerg, supra note 16, at 482.
53. See id.
54. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1447-59; Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Manage-
ment: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999).
55. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1449-50; Kraman & Hamm, supra note 54, at 966-67.
56. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1473-74.
57. See id. at 1463-64 n.68.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Again, the villains of the reformers' analyses are lawyers and jurors,
who are eager to slam any healthcare provider that apologizes. 58 Re-
form advocates argue that the VA program works for several reasons:
federal law requires that all claims be heard by a judge rather than a
jury; no claimant can be awarded punitive damages; VA physicians,
who are employees of the federal government, are not generally sub-
ject to suit as individuals; and these physicians, because of their posi-
tions as government employees, are not tied to the vagaries of
maintaining private malpractice insurance. 59 These arrangements
make for a setting in which the menace from juries and lawyers has
been largely neutralized. Without such neutralization, apology is al-
legedly impossible.
Nationwide, those boosting apology have rallied around the idea
that confidentiality is key. To this end, they have promoted legislation
that bars any judicial consideration of apology or of "benevolent ges-
tures.' '60 Perhaps the high-water mark of this effort is the following
Colorado statute:
In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an unanticipated
outcome of medical care, or in any arbitration proceeding related to
such civil action, any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or
conduct expressing apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration, condo-
lence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence which are
made by a health care provider or an employee of a health care
provider to the alleged victim, a relative of the alleged victim, or a
representative of the alleged victim and which relate to the discom-
fort, pain, suffering, injury, or death of the alleged victim as the re-
sult of the unanticipated outcome of medical care shall be
inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence
of an admission against interest.61
The scope of this exclusion is remarkably broader than the protection
granted by most other states.62 One must wonder whether the point
of apology-a statement accepting responsibility for an offense-has
been absolutely vitiated in the effort to prevent jury consideration of a
caregiver's words.63
58. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 20 (2004).
59. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1455-56.
60. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 482; accord Jonathan R. Cohen. Legislating Apol-
ogy: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (2002) (assessing the positive and negative
impacts of apology legislation).
61. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135(1) (West 2005).
62. See, e.g., MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West Supp. 2007); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1160(a) (West Supp. 2007) (both statutes focus on "benevolent" gestures and remarks rather
than admissions of liability).
63. See LAZARE. supra note 58, at 23; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settle-
ment: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 468-69 (2003).
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Not surprisingly, juryphobia not only surfaces in discussions about
error reporting and apology, but also in healthcare professionals' dis-
cussions of the merits of the medical malpractice system. In the latter
context, juryphobia does not squelch reforms, but instead energizes
calls for change. Some claim, with minimal empirical justification,
that there are many grave defects in the malpractice system, particu-
larly in the work of juries. Jury trial is deemed extremely inefficient,
costly,64 and exceedingly inaccurate in determining liability. 65 Be-
cause courts conduct jury trials in only a small percentage of malprac-
tice cases, reformers equate trials with a lottery and say that the
"threat" of using them is extortionate.66 To remove doctors from this
fearsome lottery, some reformers argue that only hospitals, HMOs,
and other organized entities should be amenable to suit and that en-
terprise liability should replace the individual tort exposure of medical
personnel. 67 This solution frees individual physicians from suit, but is
viewed by some as not going far enough. Many reformers urge more
thoroughgoing solutions that either substitute nonjudicial forums for
court procedures or remove malpractice claims from judges' and ju-
ries' scrutiny and place them before private arbitrators and
mediators.68 Such private proceedings maintain secrecy and, reform-
ers presume, would result in rulings far less critical of the medical
profession.69
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTIONS
IN THE REFORMIST LITERATURE
Medical malpractice literature is littered with untested assumptions
about the behavior of medical professionals, patients, and juries.
Some of these assumptions are critical to the policy steps urged by
reformers and cry out for empirical examination. If they are well
founded, the case for change is significantly strengthened. However,
if they are unsupported, reformers' proposals would seem to require
serious reexamination and perhaps even modification.
64. See Myers, supra note 14, at 264.
65. See Liang, supra note 25, at 349.
66. See Brennan & Howard, supra note 43.
67. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution
of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994); Myers, supra note 14, at
274-77.
68. See Liang & Small, supra note 13. at 238-42 (promoting mediation as an alternative to
litigation). Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives for the U.S. Congress from
1995 to 1999, proposed a new "health-court system" in which the majority of judges would have
medical, rather than legal, training. Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medi-
cal Malpractice Litigation in State Courts. 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361, 1419 (2003).
69. See Liang, supra note 25, at 359-60.
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A. Error Reporting
In error-reporting and doctor-patient communication regarding ia-
trogenic injuries, there are at least three critical assumptions that war-
rant social science scrutiny. The first is that medical malpractice
claims stifle the amount of injury-related information provided by
medical personnel. The second is that patients will be inclined to sue
if provided with information about medical errors in their treatment.
The third is that juries will react negatively if informed of medical
workers' error reports or comments to injured patients.
Based on the vehemence of the reformers' assertions about the chil-
ling effect of litigation, it is logical to assume that reporting, either to
error systems or patients, is powerfully influenced by medical mal-
practice activity. There are, however, reasons to doubt this core as-
sumption. Resistance to reporting is apparently not a new
phenomenon. In fact, there are grounds to believe that medical pro-
fessionals have long been close-mouthed about errors. 70 Medical cul-
ture emphasizes perfection and ostracizes those who do not achieve
it.71 These views are grounded in professional attitudes and assess-
ments and, arguably, are at the root of the nonreporting problem. 72 In
other words, the medical world's silence about its mistakes may be the
product of forces and views within medicine, rather than a response to
intrusions of the legal system. Courts eventually compelled doctors to
provide patients with more information about the risks of, and alter-
natives to, treatment through the informed consent doctrine. The tor-
tuous history of this doctrine suggests that a significant number of
doctors are not inclined to freely share information, pretreatment or
later, and that legal or other societal interventions are necessary to
break down medically manufactured walls of silence. 73 The impact of
medical culture and attitudes deserves close scrutiny before
juryphobic concerns are blamed for nonreporting.
Whatever one concludes about the impact of medical culture, the
influence of legal activity on the rate of error reporting in the health-
care industry should be examined. There are probably multiple
causes for medical silence, and the threat of legal scrutiny may be one
of them. An empirical assessment of the influence of a reasonably
reliable promise of confidentiality on the rate of error reporting would
help policymakers determine whether removing the threat of legal
scrutiny boosts the willingness to report. Unfortunately, little data on
70. See Furrow, supra note 9, at 185-89; Hyman & Silver, supra note 41, at 112.
71. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 898-99; Myers, supra note 14, at 261-62.
72. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the question exist. 74 One of the few studies available found that there
was virtually no difference in reporting rates between systems that of-
fered confidentiality and those that did not.75 In both cases, massive
underreporting was common.76 While this evidence is not definitive,
other information suggests that lawsuits are not a central factor in the
medical profession's reporting decisions. For example, the British de-
fine medical malpractice litigation fairly narrowly, yet error reporting
is less frequent in the United Kingdom than in the United States,
where malpractice dockets are relatively large.77 In America, doctors
specializing in certain areas of medical practice, like obstetrics, are far
more likely to be sued than those in other specialties. 78 In none of the
less litigious specialties, however, is reporting more robust.79 There
may be a number of explanations for these phenomena, but they cer-
tainly reinforce doubts about the causal link between litigation and
resistance to reporting.
At least one other point raises questions about the reformers' hy-
pothesized connection between malpractice litigation and reporting.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, anesthesiologists faced rising error rates
and sky-rocketing insurance premiums.80 Through a concerted pro-
gram of training, equipment redesign, and reporting, the anesthesiol-
ogy specialty drove down the error rate dramatically. 81 This was
accomplished despite aggressive efforts by the plaintiffs' bar to bring
and win medical malpractice claims. Similar results have been re-
ported elsewhere, including emergency room care, the provision of
transfusions, and the dispensing of prescription medication.82 Report-
ing has led to significant improvements in safety, notwithstanding sub-
stantial litigation. All this casts doubt on the assertions that
confidentiality plays a key role in safety improvement or even in error
reporting. To answer questions posed by these facts, careful study is
warranted.
74. See Chiang, supra note 20, at 396 ("The number of studies investigating the problem of
underreporting is small and their sample sizes are smaller."); Furrow, supra note 9, at 203.
75. See Furrow, supra note 9, at 203 & n.162 (citing State Reporting of Medical Errors and
Adverse Events: Results of a 50-State Survey, Executive Summary, available at http://www.nashp.
org/_docdisp-page.cfm?LID=0560704C-4CAC-11D6-BCEE0OAOCC558925).
76. Id. at 203.
77. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 41, at 111.
78. Michael Klaus, Outsourcing Vital Operations: What if U.S. Health Care Costs Drive Pa-
tients Overseas for Surgery?, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 230 (2006).
79. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1137, 1139-40
(2006).
80. See Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 4; Myers, supra note 14, at 266.
81. See Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 4-5; Myers, supra note 14, at 266; see also Barach,
supra note 2, at 19 & n.75.
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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One key analogy reformers have relied upon to justify their calls for
confidentiality involves the aviation industry, in which a confidential
near-miss reporting system has been in operation for many years.83
No one using the system is called to account for the contents of a
report. In fact, the only way to get into trouble is to fail to report a
near-miss incident when others do So. 8 4 Submitted reports are ana-
lyzed and often lead to directives designed to enhance safety. 85 While
the aviation model has appeal, several points suggest caution is neces-
sary before concluding that an essentially identical system is war-
ranted in medicine. In the aviation industry, all crashes are
thoroughly investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB).8 6 The NTSB's work is not confidential and may be utilized
by litigants.8 7 Tort doctrines, like res ipsa loquitur, make liability find-
ings a near certainty in commercial aviation cases.8 8 When an airliner
goes down, victims are virtually always compensated. The key con-
cerns are how much will be paid and by whom. This should be con-
trasted with medical malpractice litigation, where causation and
liability are often hotly contested and there is no definitive assessment
of the sort provided by the NTSB. The legal landscape in these two
areas is so different that one must wonder whether the aviation expe-
rience has much to teach us about medical error reporting.
The juryphobic hypothesis is that unprotected communications ad-
mitting error-especially admissions to patients-will increase the
volume of litigation. At the outset, it should be noted that the level of
malpractice claiming in America is far below the level of injury, rais-
ing significant doubts about the litigiousness of American patients.89
83. See Barach, supra note 2, at 20-21.
84. Id.
85. LINDA J. CONNELL, CROSS-INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS OF A CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING
MODEL, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/62 Cross% 20Industry %20Applications % 20of% 20Re-
porting%20Model.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
86. See Aviation Attorney Blog, http://www.aviationattorneyblog.com/page/3 (last visited Jan.
29, 2008).
87. See Trowbridge Littleton, The National Transportation Safety Board: How Should They
Conduct Witness Investigations- The Need for a Privilege, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 255 (2000):
After an aircraft accident there is a civil trial for damages. In most cases these suits are
brought many months if not years after the accident has occurred. In an effort to ob-
tain the best information available on the accident, litigants routinely move, under the
Freedom of Information Act. to get the reports of the NTSB.
Additionally, in most circumstance [sic], the Factual Report (which contains the Field
Notes) is admissible at trial under the public documents exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 261.
88. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 246-47 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984).
89. See To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1; Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error In Situ: Im-
plications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005) (finding that 13 of
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The idea that large numbers of previously docile but injured patients
will rise up in response to error reports may exaggerate the influence
of such reports. Putting that aside, studies suggest that patients appre-
ciate candor about medical errors and that such communication both
reduces patients' inclinations to sue their doctors and makes
caregivers seem more human and sympathetic to their injured pa-
tients. 90 Suits grow in number when doctors appear dishonest, arro-
gant, or unconcerned about the consequences and implications of
their mistakes. 91 While lawsuits-especially those concerning serious
injuries-are unlikely to disappear because of error reporting, the pa-
tient reaction data cast doubt upon the hypothesis that reporting with-
out confidentiality is legal suicide.92 More research is clearly
warranted to assess patients' reactions to reform.
It is an article of the reformist faith that juries exposed to error
reports will be more inclined to find against caregivers in medical mal-
practice cases. Reformers advance numerous theoretical bases for
that contention. Some claim that error reports and similar statements
will trigger the "hindsight bias" of the jury.93 Hindsight bias has been
observed in the deliberations of juries that are asked to determine the
before-the-fact (ex ante) reasonableness of a course of conduct result-
ing in injury.94 The usual source of hindsight bias is the fact of the
injury. In such cases, the injury is "read back" into the preceding cir-
cumstances to suggest that the defendant knew, or should have
known, that his actions were unreasonably risky.95 Hindsight bias is a
serious problem in some negligence cases and in cases where ques-
tionable business decisions are reviewed. 96 In the context of error re-
porting, however, its relevance may be questioned. Error reports
declare medical mistakes; they do not, however, suggest medical fore-
knowledge or unreasonableness ex ante. The complained of injury in
a case may provoke hindsight bias, but it is less clear that an ex post
1,047 patients who suffered medical errors brought claims); Hyman & Silver, supra note 41, at
116; Studdert et al., supra note 18, at 17.
90. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 482, 497 n.79; Myers, supra note 14, at 278 &
n.224.
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 16, at 482, 497 n.79; Myers, supra note 14, at 278 &
n.224.
93. See Liang & Small, supra note 13, at 229.
94. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante:
Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Susan J. LaBine & Gary
LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501
(1996).
95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
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report enhances the bias already triggered by the facts. Thus, such
reports require further empirical scrutiny before reformers can con-
clude that they heighten hindsight bias.
Error reports are admissions of mistakes. They resemble confes-
sions or inculpatory statements in criminal cases. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that confessions are so influential when wrongfully ad-
mitted that they destroy the jury's ability to dispassionately consider
the defendant's innocence. 97 Psychological examination has tended to
confirm the power of confessions and the risk they pose to deci-
sionmakers. 98 If error reports work like confessions, they may seri-
ously endanger the fairness of fact finding in medical malpractice
actions. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is untested, and there are dif-
ferent sorts of error reports containing different types of information.
If confidentiality is to be justified, a robust program that empirically
assesses the impacts of error report and error admission evidence in
malpractice cases would be useful. The first question is whether jurors
will understand how to use error reports and admissions. All error
reports are not created equal. Some will clearly document errors
amounting to malpractice, others will show mistakes that are legally
defensible, and still others will be entirely irrelevant to the legal issues
surrounding a patient's injury. In addition, certain reporting systems
will only describe near misses, which, by definition, have not led to
harm. Whether jurors can successfully distinguish between these dif-
ferent error documents and use them appropriately presents an im-
portant question. The risk of unfounded verdicts is substantially
reduced if jurors can appropriately discriminate between different
kinds of error documents.
A second question concerns the impact that relevant error report
documents will have on cases in which they are used. Will such docu-
ments function like confessions, overwhelming other evidence? Will
they dictate liability even when causation is unclear? Will they boost
jury awards? On one hand, admissions of error may be perceived as
honorable efforts to improve medical care. In that case, jurors' reac-
tions may mirror patients' reactions, and doctors may be viewed more
sympathetically, which might ultimately reduce awards. Alternatively,
if error information has been suppressed or defendants absolutely
deny liability, the introduction of error reports may be seen as re-
vealing a smoking gun that justifies a large verdict, especially because
97. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
98. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 86-93 (1988).
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the defendants' conduct looks like a cover-up. 99 Many more questions
deserve examination. The challenge is to design simulation experi-
ments that yield broadly applicable data.
B. Apology
Questions raised by the apology literature are similar to those con-
sidered with respect to reporting. The medical culture that has fos-
tered silence rather than reporting has also restrained apology. There
was little medical literature advocating apology until the last decade,
and erring doctors and other healthcare professionals have never rou-
tinely provided apologies. 100 Again, the problem may be traced to
attitudes within the medical profession, rather than litigation's perni-
cious influence. Nevertheless, the questions remain whether litigation
concerns have significantly increased the fear of apology and whether
the present legal climate makes reform more difficult. There is so lit-
tle information available that it is impossible to answer such questions.
However, if apology works like error reporting, it is reasonable to sug-
gest that malpractice litigation rates will scarcely be influenced by the
frequency of apology.10
Regarding the question of patient reaction to apology, the most use-
ful information comes from the analogous error-reporting studies.
These studies suggest that a significant number of patients will react
positively to apology, as they do to an admission of error.10 2 Many
patients are likely to view an apology as a caregiver's effort at hon-
esty.'0 3 Perceived lack of candor is a key determinant in patients' de-
cisions to sue.10 4  A proper apology may dissuade a substantial
number of patients from litigating.10 5 It is unclear, however, whether
all sorts of apologies will similarly affect patients. 10 6 Theoretically, a
99. See Brian H. Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock Juror Decisions
in a Malpractice Case, 20 BEHAV. Sci. & LAW 393 (2002) (noting the varied impact of apology on
awards based on the timing of the apology).
100. See LAZARE, supra note 58, at 98; Ninth Annual Stein Center Symposium, The Role of
Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347, 1426 (2000).
101. Brian Bornstein, in communications with the author, has suggested that adopting laws to
protect apology raises similar empirical questions about physician awareness of legal change and
the effect, if any, on the rate and finality of apology.
102. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure
of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003).
103. Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey
of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2565,
2566 (1996).
104. Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives
Taking Legal Action. 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994).
105. See LAZARE, supra note 58, at 173.
106. See Robbennolt, supra note 63.
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vague or general apology will be less effective than a specific one. For
example, an apology from a hospital's chief of staff will be less power-
ful than one from the medical professional who made the mistake.
Likewise, an apology that does not offer compensation will be less
influential than one that does. These matters merit empirical
scrutiny. 107
A central issue, equally relevant to apology and error reporting, is
how jurors will use information acknowledging mistakes in determin-
ing liability and fixing damages in malpractice litigation. Are jurors
capable of making the fine distinctions necessary to interpret varying
sorts of caregiver remarks? Much legislation in the apology area dif-
ferentiates "benevolent gestures" from apologies. Benevolent ges-
tures-statements voicing sympathy, commiseration, or compassion-
are most frequently classified as confidential. 10  Whether jurors can
recognize this distinction and act accordingly presents an interesting
question.' 0 9
Assuming that a full-blown apology is made, the next issue to be
determined is its impact on a liability finding and on the amount
awarded in damages. One might reasonably anticipate that an apol-
ogy will moderate an award because of the positive feelings a medical
professional's candor will likely generate. 1 0 Currently, however,
scholars have little data in the area and none concerning liability.11' If
apology were found to cut liability determinations and damage
amounts, states barring legal consideration of such materials may
cause a boomerang effect that raises awards by excluding evidence of
caregivers' contrition. One might argue that the Colorado statute
quoted above has this effect unless judges read it to only bar plaintiffs
from using apologies to establish liability rather than barring all liti-
gants from referencing any apology that is "an admission of liability."
The impact of apology on settlement discussions also merits examina-
tion. Whether settlements grow in number or size because of apolo-
gies seems an open question.' 12
Some of the reform literature has discussed the "strategic" use of
apology-the calculated deployment of apology to forestall suits or
107. Id.
108. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
109. See Robbennolt, supra note 63, at 470.
110. See Bornstein et al., supra note 99: Robbennolt, supra note 63, at 464 n.17.
111. Robbennolt, supra note 63, at 465 n.19.
112. Id. at 485-86.
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reduce damages. 113 Will such strategies work, or will juries and pa-
tients react to them as they do to dishonest or dissembling behavior?
Further, does it matter when an apology is made? One expects that
sooner is better, but the question is open." 4 The matter takes on ad-
ded salience when one considers a lawyer advising a doctor to apolo-
gize at trial, or at some other point during legal proceedings, in an
effort to lessen the risk of a large damage award.
V. STEPS SHORT OF SCRAPPING THE JURY TRIAL
If researchers determined that jurors are prone to misuse error-re-
porting data, there are a number of steps that might be taken to re-
duce the problem without placing burdensome restrictions on the trial
process. The first is to collect only near-miss data. Such an approach
would, by definition, not gather material regarding injurious events
and would, in the vast majority of cases, not produce information rele-
vant to medical malpractice litigation.115 Near-miss reporting's irrele-
vance would make it far less likely to be subject to litigation-driven
discovery. This effect may be strengthened if the data submitted are
"deidentified" subsequent to filing.116 Because there is significant
value in dialogue at the time reports are submitted, anonymous filings
would seem inferior to reports that indicate the identity of the filer." 7
Once follow-up questions and clarifications have been completed,
however, the utility of identified information is probably outweighed
by the value of confidentiality so that identifying information ought to
be purged. As a further measure of insulation, error report data
might be aggregated so that individual incidents are melded into an
overall picture for safety diagnosis but disconnected from any particu-
lar patient or claim. These points do not directly affect patient safety,
but provide approaches that may facilitate and encourage healthcare
industry use of reporting systems.
For obvious reasons, record-keeping solutions will not work with
respect to error reports provided to injured patients and apologies. If
courtroom use of such materials poses a real threat to safety report-
ing, then a number of in-court responses are possible. Over the last
thirty years, courts and psychologists have developed a series of pro-
113. For a description of the Toro Company's seemingly strategic use of apology techniques to
reduce its liability for injuries suffered using its mowers and other lawn care products, see Co-
hen, supra note 15, at 1460-62.
114. Bornstein et al., supra note 99; Robbennolt, supra note 63, at 467 n.25.
115. See Barach, supra note 2, at 16-17.
116. See Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 9-10.
117. Id.
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tective interventions to deal with eyewitness testimony-evidence that
jurors sometimes overvalue.1 18 Courts seldom bar such material but
have a process for guarding against its misuse. 19 The three responses
that are most frequently permitted are vigorous cross-examination of
the eyewitness (the response traditionally relied upon), the use of ex-
pert testimony to describe potential flaws in eyewitness testimony,
and limiting instructions designed to caution jurors against excessive
reliance on certain eyewitness material.1 20 These approaches, though
imperfect, have been demonstrably helpful. 12' Evaluating the utility
of these tools in the error-reporting and apology contexts seems ap-
propriate, particularly if such statements prove overly persuasive to
jurors.
If error reporting or apologies are found to inordinately influence
juries despite these interventions, it may be worth classifying them as
confidential and prohibiting them in the courtroom. The choice to
"blindfold" jurors should be viewed as a last resort. Shari Diamond
and her colleagues have identified a number of problems that arise
with blindfolding, particularly the possibility that jurors will make er-
roneous factual assumptions absent accurate information about poten-
tially influential topics. 22 The result of embargoing the topic of
insurance coverage illustrates Diamond's point. Blindfolded jurors
still think and talk about the existence of insurance. 23 Failing to ad-
dress insurance has not made juries more reliable but rather less ame-
nable to court supervision and direction. The analogy between
problems with insurance and error reports or apologies is imperfect,
but, if it is shown that such materials can bias juror attitudes, policy-
makers should consider blindfold regulations.
VI. AFTERWORD
There is substantial evidence that medical culture on its own pro-
duced the environment in which errors are not reported, information
is not shared, and apologies are not made. It is striking that reformers
118. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 127-28 (1986).
119. See Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 807, 827-35 (2007).
120. See WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, READ-
INGS. AND TEXT 549-600 (1984); Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 817 (1995).
121. See Wise et al., supra note 119.
122. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Con-
sequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513 (1992).
123. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Top-
ics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001).
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spend so much time and effort on litigation questions rather than on
problems posed by medical attitudes and culture. It is possible to see
this as blaming the victims for complaining about malpractice. Adopt-
ing a policy of secrecy vis-A-vis the courts is a troubling step, especially
when the medical profession has not displayed willingness to self-or-
ganize and accept responsibility for errors. Instead, it has fought with
all its might to cap the damages awarded to children and elderly seri-
ously injured by malpractice. The motive for this approach to mal-
practice does not seem to be improvement of care, but rather
protection of the bottom line. On a number of prior occasions,
medicine has had to be pushed to adopt changes beneficial to patients.
This was the case with respect to informed consent. Perhaps society
needs to push once again. Learned Hand, in the case of the T.J.
Hooper,124 decided that the well-settled custom of an industry had to
yield to the safety interests of society at large. Before such a step is
taken, however, we need more data about the behavior of caregivers,
patients, and juries.
124. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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